Matter of Estate of Smith Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 45313 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-5-2018 
Matter of Estate of Smith Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45313 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Matter of Estate of Smith Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45313" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & 
Briefs, All. 7194. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7194 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
FILED -7COF 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH SUPREME COURT 
COURT OF APPEALS  
In the Matter of the Estate of Victoria H. 
Smith, Deceased. Supreme Court Docket No. 45313-2017 
VERNON K. SMITH, JR., et al, 
Plaintiff-Appellant-
Appellant on Appeal, 
v. 
JOSEPH H. SMITH, an intestate heir of the 
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, Deceased, 
Defendant-Respondent-
Respondent on Appeal, 
and 
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Victoria H. Smith, 
Intervenor-Respondent on Appeal. 
 
Ada County Magistrate Court 
No. CVIE-2014-15352 
   
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County, 
Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, Presiding 
Randall A. Peterman 
Alex P. McLaughlin 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Noah G. 
Hillen, Intervenor-
Respondent on Appeal 
Rory Jones 
William A. Fuhrman 
Erika P. Judd 
Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, Gourley, P.A. 
225 N. 9th  St., Ste. 820 
P. 0. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: (208)331-1529 
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith Jr., Plaintiff- 
Appellant-Appellant on Appeal 
Allen B. Ellis 
Ellis Law, PLLC 
2537 W. State St., Ste 140 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile: (208)345-9564 
Attorney for Joseph H. Smith 
Defendant-Respondent-
Respondent on Appeal 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Page  
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................................... 2 
Nature of case ..................................................................................................................... 2 
Course of proceedings below ............................................................................................. 3 
Petition for fiduciary breach/accounting .............................................................. 3 
Partial summary judgment ..................................................................................... 3 
Trial ....................................................................................................................... 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................... 5 
Vernon's testimony on the execution 
of the holographic Will ..................................................................................................... 5 
The Will .............................................................................................................................. 5 
Breakdown of the Magistrate's factual findings .............................................................. 6 
Vernon's lack of credibility ...............................................................................................  6 
Vernon was Mrs. Smith's attorney throughout 
his career ............................................................................................................................ 7 
Vernon provided his mother legal advice in 
drafting and preparing the holographic Will ..................................................................... 7 
The Magistrate invalidated Vernon's transfer of the 
entirety of Mrs. Smith's property to his LLC ..................................................................... 8 
In the year of the Will (1990), the evidence supports 
the finding that Mrs. Smith was susceptible to 
Vernon's persuasion ........................................................................................................... 9 
In the months prior to and subsequent to the Will's 
execution, Joseph and his family had a good 
relationship with Mrs. Smith .......................................................................................... 9 
Vernon was responsible for Joseph's estrangement 
from Mrs. Smith ................................................................................................................. 9 
There is an absence of evidence explaining Mrs. Smith's 
disinheritance of her daughter Victoria Converse ..........................................................  10 
Father Faucher's testimony is relevant to three of 
the four elements of undue influence: (1) susceptibility 
(2) opportunity, and (3) Vernon's disposition to unduly influence ................................  11 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................. 12 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 12 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................................................................................... 12 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law ........................................................................... 12 
Summary judgment ......................................................................................................... 13 
Evidentiary rulings ...........................................................................................................  13 
RESULT SOUGHT AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................... 13 
Result sought ...................................................................................................................  13 
Summary of argument ..................................................................................................... 14 
THE MAGISTRATE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT CORRECTLY RULED, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT VERNON'S PRE-DEATH CONVEYANCE 
OF ESTATE ASSETS TO HIS LLC WAS INVALID IN THE ABSENCE 
OF GIFTING AUTHORITY IN MRS. SMITH'S POWER OF ATTORNEY .......................... 15 
The Magistrate had jurisdiction to invalidate the deed to 
Vernon's LLC .................................................................................................................. 15 
Respondent Joseph's standing to challenge Appellant Vernon's 
2012 conveyance of Mrs. Smith's real property .............................................................  16 
II 
The principal's death does not immunize the agent 
from judicial scrutiny ....................................................................................................... 17 
Res judicata does not bar Joseph's claim of an invalid conveyance .............................. 17 
Inapplicability of "coupled with an interest" exception ..................................................  18 
Invalidation of Vernon's "gifts" to his 
LLC based upon the ineffective Power of Attorney ........................................................  19 
THE ELEMENTS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE NECESSARY 
RELIANCE ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ................................................................ 19 
Elements of undue influence ..........................................................................................  19 
Alienation and isolation: classic signposts of decedent' susceptibility 
and of Vernon's opportunity and disposition to unduly influence .................................. 20 
Necessary reliance on factual inferences ........................................................................ 20 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE 
DECEDENT'S WILL WAS THE RESULT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE .................................. 21 
VERNON HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ............................................................................ 26 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE EXISTENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE .......................................................................... 27 
Stopgap utility of holographic wills ................................................................................. 27 
Susceptibility of the Testatrix to undue influence 
and Vernon's exploitation thereof ..................................................................................... 28 
Opportunity to Influence the Testatrix ............................................................................. 33 
Disposition to exert undue influence ............................................................................. 33 
Testamentary result indicative of undue influence ........................................................ 34 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARISING OUTSIDE THE 
FEBRUARY 14TH  WINDOW IS ADMISSIBLE ....................................................................... 35 
iii 
An assessment of undue influence merely by taking a snapshot of the 
day of the Will's execution would be an incomplete assessment ..................................... 35 
In the instance of an attorney/beneficiary, exploitation of the 
testatrix' susceptibility can persist until death ...................................................................... 37 
Objection to the admissibility of Exhibit 257 was properly sustained ..............................  38 
WHILE PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS TESTACY OVER INTESTACY, THIS 
POLICY IS LIMITED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS, AND DOES 
NOT PERTAIN TO THE EXISTENCE, OR NOT, OF UNDUE INFLUENCE ........................ 38 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 39 
iv 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES  
CASES Page 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008) ............................................................  13 
Blackman v. Edsall, 68 P. 790 (Colo. 1902) ..............................................................................  21 
Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 974 P.2d 70 (1999) ............................................................  22 
Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734, 718 P.2d 1172 (1986) ................................................  26, 39 
Burke v. Burke, 082417 DESC. 48 (2017) ................................................................................... 17 
Carroll v. Norton, 3 Brad.. Sur 291 ............................................................................................. 27 
In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal.2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 (1940) ..........................................................  35 
In re Burke Estate, Del.Ch. Lexis 121 (2016) ............................................................................. 17 
Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 277 P.3d 380 (2012) ................................................  13, 20, 34 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339 (1963) ............................................................  38 
In re Hannam's Estate, 236 P.2d 208 (1951) ............................................................................. 20 
In re Heazle's Estate, 74 Idaho 72, 257 P.2d 556 (1953) ..........................................................  35 
Estate of Higgins, 104 P. 6 (Cal. 1909) .......................................................................................  21 
In re Lunders ' Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 263 P.2d 1002, (1953) ..........................................  20, 21, 34 
In re Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419, 93 P. 2d (1939) ................................................  20, 21, 32 
In re Wallace 's Will, 265 N.Y.S. 898 (1933) ............................................................................... 27 
Gill v. Gill, 254 S.E.2d 122 (Va. 1979) .......................................................................................  23 
Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 592 P.2d 57 (1979) ....................................................... 20, 29, 40 
Green v. Green,161 Idaho 675, 389 P.3d 961, 966 (2017) ................................................. 20, 23 
Green River Ranches, LLC, v. Silva Land Co., LLC, 162 Idaho 385, 397 P.3d 1144 (2017) 13 
Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613, 200 P.3d 1162 (2009) .................................. 13 
Howell v. Eastern Idaho Railroad, Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 24 P.3d 50 (2001) .............................. 13 
King v. McDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 410 P.2d 969 (1965) ............................................................  20 
Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291 (Ohio, 1991) ........................................................  36, 37 
Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 757 P.2d 1222 (1988) ....................................................  26 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003) ..............................................................  18 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 212 P.3d 992 (2009) ................................ 13 
Pincock v. Pocatello Gold, 100 Idaho 325, 597 P.2d 211 (1979) ..............................................  15 
Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692, (1946) ..................................................  22 
Watkins Co, LLC, v. Storm, 152 Idaho 531, 272 P.3d 503 (2012) ........................................  13, 15 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743 (2010) ................................................................  13 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code § 12-121 .............................................................................................................  12, 40 
Idaho Code § 15-2-502 ...............................................................................................................  28 
Idaho Code § 15-2-503 ........................................................................................................ 6, 27-28 
Idaho Code § 15-8-208 .......................................................................................................... 12, 40 
Idaho Code § 15-12-103 (1) .........................................................................................................  18 
Idaho Code § 15-12-114(8) .........................................................................................................  17 
Idaho Code § 15-12-116(1) .........................................................................................................  16 
Idaho Code § 15-12-117 .............................................................................................................  16 
Idaho Code § 15-12-201(1)(b) .....................................................................................................  14 
vi 
Idaho Code § 17-201 ........................................................................................  4 
Idaho Code § 17-201(3) ....................................................................................  4 
Idaho Code § 17-201(5) ....................................................................................  4, 12 
RULES 
Rule 54(e)(2), I.R.C.P. ......................................................................................  12 
Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P ..........................................................................................  14 
Rule 83(a)(2)(F), LR.C.P. ................................................................................  12 
OTHER 
What Constitutes Power Coupled with an Interest within Rule 
as to Termination of Agency, 28 A.L.R. 1243 §2(a) ........................................ 18 
vii 
Comes now Contestant/Respondent Joseph H. Smith, through his attorney of record, and 
submits the herein Respondent's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE' 
Nature of case:  This case is ancillary to the probate of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. It 
presents the issue, inter alia, whether the decedent's holographic Will (Exhibit 208) was procured 
by the undue influence of her son, Appellant Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"). Vernon was the 
decedent's only attorney and was the sole beneficiary in the Will. At the time of her death, Mrs. 
Smith's heirs in the event of intestacy were her three children: Vernon, Respondent Joseph H. Smith 
("Joseph"), and Victoria Converse ("Ms. Converse"). Respondent Joseph has challenged the validity 
of the Will. 
Subsequent to the execution of the 1990 Will, Mrs. Smith, in her 95th year, executed a 2008 
Power of Attorney (Exhibit 4) in favor of Vernon. In 2012, utilizing this document, Vernon 
conveyed the entirety of Mrs. Smith's assets to his limited liability company, VHS Properties, LLC. 
Mrs. Smith died in 2013. At the time Vernon transferred all of Mrs. Smith's assets to his LLC, her 
prospective estate had a value in excess of $20,000,000. A second issue, thus presented, is whether 
this gifting was authorized by Mrs. Smith's Power of Attorney. If it was a valid conveyance, there 
are no estate assets to be probated, and the validity of the Will is academic. 
Except for repeated disparagement of the Magistrate's decision as "cursory", "result-driven", 
and "rank conjecture", Appellant's Brief contains no glaring factual inaccuracies. But Appellant is 
unduly prolix. The herein statement is intended to provide the reader with comprehensive but digestible 
information required by Rule 35, I.A.R. 
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Course of proceedings below:  After Mrs. Smith's demise, her eldest son, the Respondent 
Joseph, filed a Petition for Formal Adjudication of Intestacy. (R. p. 45) In Vernon's response, 
Vernon objected on the grounds that there were no assets to be probated because of the transfer of 
these assets to his LLC in 2012, utilizing Mrs. Smith's Power of Attorney ("POA"). See Response 
and Objection to Petition for Formal Adjudication of Intestacy (R. p. 87). Two weeks later, however, 
Vernon filed Application for Formal Probate of Will, seeking to probate Mrs. Smith's 1990 
holographic Will (R. p. 194). 
Joseph's petition for fiduciary breach: Joseph filed a petition seeking an accounting 
and asserting that Vernon committed fiduciary breach in management of Estate assets (R. p. 205). 
In response to Vernon's motion to dismiss the petition, the Honorable Christopher Bieter "reserved 
decision" on Joseph's petition pending litigation of the undue influence allegations (Tr. p. 16, L. 20 
to p. 17, L. 15), i.e., "so let's talk about when we can try that. I'm going to reserve decision on the 
motion to dismiss Counts I and III [breach of fiduciary duty and accounting] but to (sic) let you 
contest the will". Id. 
Partial summary judgment: Prior to trial in this matter, Respondent Joseph filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment seeking an adjudication that Vernon's pre-death conveyance 
of Mrs. Smith's assets to his LLC was invalid as exceeding the scope of the POA. This motion was 
based on the absence of gifting authority in the POA. The Magistrate Court agreed and set aside this 
2012 inter-vivos conveyance: 
Because the 2008 Power of Attorney did not contain a specific, 
express grant of authority to gift Victoria H. Smith's property., 
Vernon K. Smith, Jr., had no authority to gift her property to  
anyone or to himself . . 
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The Court further orders all property returned to the estate and 
that no party transfer any of that property without order of this 
Court. 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 12, 17, entered July 19, 2016 (emphasis in original). 
(R. pp. 1060, 1065) 
Trial:  The matter proceeded to a two-day court trial before the Honorable Cheri C. 
Copsey, sitting as a Magistrate Judge. After taking evidence and written argument, the Court 
concluded, by written decision, that the holographic Will was the product of Vernon's undue 
influence. This decision had two independent procedural bases: (1) Vernon's failure to rebut the 
presumption of undue influence, and (2) a preponderance of the evidence established the existence 
of undue influence: 
Based on the evidence presented at the court trial, the Court finds that 
Vernon failed to introduce "that quantum of evidence that tends to 
show that no undue influence existed". 
The Court further finds that even if Vernon had rebutted the 
presumption with minimal evidence, Joseph directly or through 
Vernon's own witnesses and evidence produced a preponderance of 
evidence that Victoria's will leaving all her earthly possessions to 
Vernon was the product of undue influence. Therefore, the Court 
finds her holographic will is invalid and Victoria H. Smith died 
intestate. 
FF/CL, p. 26, (R. p. 1592) (emphasis in original). 
Now Vernon appeals the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R. p. 1049) and the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law2  (R. p. 1567). 
2 
 Although there is no judgment in place, the appealability of these two decisions is based on 
Idaho Code § 17-201, a 19th  century statute which authorizes an immediate appeal from an "order of the 
magistrates (sic) division of the district court in probate matters:... 3. Against or in favor of the validity of 
a will" and "5. Against or in favor of directing the . . . conveyance of real property". Id., § 17-201(3) and 
§ 17-201(5). See Missoula Mercantile Co. v. Whelan, 6 Idaho 78, 81, 53 P. 2 (1898). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vernon's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Smith's execution of the  
holographic Will:  Vernon testified as follows on the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the handwritten Will on February 14, 1990: 
Q. What happened on that day? 
A. On that day I was called at the office late afternoon. My mother 
said she would like for me to stop by. I came out to the ranch and 
came into the house because she wanted me to witness her sign her 
will. And I said I would do that. 
Q. And so you went to her house? 
A. I went to her house that evening. Probably between 6:00 and 7:00. 
And she had the will on a piece of paper, the Court has the original, 
on the Magnavox. And she said come here. And I went there and I 
watched her sign her name to the will that she had already fully made 
out. 
Q. BY MR. JONES: Now, did you take the will with you or did it 
stay at her house? 
A. My mother gave it — she offered for me to take it to the office for 
safekeeping and I said mother, why don't we just leave it here in your 
rolltop desk in your living room. 
Tr. p. 209, L. 20; Tr. p. 212, L. 5. 
The Will: The Will recited as follows, in its entirety: 
In event of my death I give all my property, real and personal, to my 
son Vernon with right to serve as Executor without bond. 
I have given my son Joseph real and personal property in my life 
time. I have given my daughter, Victoria Converse, personal 
property in my life time. 
Holographic Will. Dated February 14, 1990. 
Victoria H. Smith 
Exhibit 208. 
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The Will conformed to the requisite formalities of Idaho Code § 15-2-503, pertaining to 
holographic wills. 
Breakdown of the Magistrate's factual findings:  In the Magistrate's Findings of Fact, she 
separated her findings into the following categories: (1) the members of the Smith family; (2) 
Vernon's credibility; (3) the authorship of decedent's holographic Will; (4) Mrs. Smith's Power of 
Attorney and Vernon's transfer of all her assets to his LLC; (5) Mrs. Smith's susceptibility to 
Vernon's influence in 1990, the year the Will was made; (6) pre-Will relationship between Mrs. 
Smith and Joseph's family; (7) the absence of a factual basis explanatory of Mrs. Smith's 
disinheritance of her daughter; and (8) the testimony of Father Faucher. (FF/CL, pp. 7 - 22). (R. 
pp. 1483-1498) 
The highlights of the Amended Findings of Fact are set forth below, in accordance with the 
Magistrate's factual categories, with citations to the record or trial transcript. 
Magistrate's finding that Vernon lacked credibility:  
(1) In the presence of Mrs. Smith, Joseph refused Vernon's request to participate as 
a buyer at the IRS foreclosure and auction of the residence which was owned by Vernon's soon-to-
be ex-wife as her separate property (FF/CL, p. 7; Tr. p. 236, L. 9-25; R. p. 1483). 
(2) Upon Joseph's refusal, Vernon requested Mrs. Smith participate in the auction 
and buy his wife's residence with her own money, which she did. Vernon testified that he engaged 
this scheme to prevent his wife from arguing that the residence became community property upon 
sale to him (FF/CL, p. 7; Tr. p. 332, L. 4 - 9; R. p. 1483). 
(3) Vernon requested that the IRS perform a forensic audit on his law office accounts 
in an attempt to persuade the Magistrate that his ex-wife "had been stealing from him". Vernon 
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failed to present credible evidence that the IRS performs forensic audits at a taxpayer's request 
(FF/CL, p. 8;Tr. p. 232, L. 18-23.) (R. p. 1484). 
(4) Vernon abused his mother's 2008 Power of Attorney by the conveyance of all her 
assets to his limited liability company, VHS Properties, LLC. (FF/CL, p. 8)(R. p. 1484); Order 
Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) (R. p. 1049). This abuse of the Power of Attorney 
supports the Magistrate's finding that Vernon was not a credible witness and possessed the 
disposition to engage in undue influence. 
(5) Vernon's testimony is not credible that Joseph was aware of the Will's existence 
prior to Mrs. Smith' death. (FF/CL, p. 8; Tr. pp. 37, L. 24 - 38, L. 5.) (R. p. 1484). See contrary 
testimony by Joseph and his wife Sharon (Tr. p. 37, L. 24 to p. 38, L. 5; Tr. p. 492, L. 23 to p. 493, 
L. 2) 
Vernon testified that he was Mrs. Smith's attorney from the day he was admitted to the 
Bar until her death and beyond.  
Q. BY MR. ELLIS. You were Mrs. Smith's attorney, correct? 
A. I was from—since I graduated and passed the Bar examination in 
1971 I was the attorney whenever she needed me. . . 
Tr. p. 335, L. 4 - 10. 
In a footnote, the Magistrate identified a lawsuit which Vernon filed naming Mrs. Smith as 
plaintiff after her passing (FF/CL, p. 8, fn. 7) {R. p. 1484). 
According to the Magistrate, Vernon "provided his mother legal advice in drafting and 
preparing the holographic Will" (FF/CL, p. 11; R. p. 1487).  
The Magistrate found Vernon's testimony implausible that the format of Mrs. Smith's Will 
was influenced solely by her husband's 1960 holographic will (R. p. 1486), i.e., "[b]oth the Will's 
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language and its circumstances give rise to the inference that she had some legal advice in its 
preparation" (FF/CL, p. 10). (R. p. 1486) 
Vernon was the only person present and as he repeatedly and proudly 
proclaimed throughout this case, she [Mrs. Smith] relied heavily on 
him for legal advice and had done so since 1971. It makes no sense 
she would not have relied on him here, especially given the language, 
his presence and other circumstances. 
Victoria Smith was a lifetime housewife and mother . . No one 
produced evidence that she was sophisticated in the law. . . The 
court finds that the language in her will does not mirror Vernon K. 
Smith, Sr.'s holographic will language, and the language is not that 
of a layperson. Based on the evidence, testimony, Vernon's lack of 
credibility, and the holographic will's language itself, the Court 
concludes that, contrary to his testimony, Vernon provided his mother 
legal advice in drafting and preparing her will. 
FF/CL, pp. 9, 10 (Tr. p. 36, LL. 4-10; p. 337, L. 15-18). (R. pp. 1485-6). 
Vernon testified that he did not discuss with his mother whether to consult an estate planning 
professional (Tr. p. 342, Ll. 20- 22), and one was not consulted. 
The Magistrate's above description of Victoria Smith was that she was a "housewife" without 
evidence that she had "sophistication in the law". Contrary to the Appellant's Brief, the Magistrate 
did not cast Mrs. Smith in a pejorative light, i.e., the Magistrate did not "trivialize her intelligence", 
suggest that Mrs. Smith was "too ignorant", "belittle" her intelligence, or otherwise engage in "rank 
conjecture" as to Mrs. Smith's mental abilities. See Appellant Brief, pp. 24 - 26. 
The Magistrate invalidated Vernon's transfer of the entirety of Mrs. Smith's property 
to his LLC as a breach of his fiduciary duty: 
 "Again, Vernon offered no credible evidence his 
mother had any idea that he was transferring all of her earthly possessions effectively to either VHS 
properties or ultimately to himself" (FF/CL p. 13; R. p. 1579). And: "Therefore, he violated this 
Act [the Uniform Power of Attorney Act], his fiduciary duty, and the 2008 Power of Attorney" (Id., 
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R. p. 1065). This abuse of Mrs. Smith's Power of Attorney supports the Magistrate's finding that 
Vernon was not a credible witness and had the disposition to engage in undue influence. 
In the year of the Will (1990) and beyond, the Magistrate ruled that the evidence 
supports the finding that Mrs. Smith was susceptible to Vernon's persuasion: As noted above, 
in 1990 Vernon persuaded his mother to bid at a foreclosure on his soon-to-be ex-wife's property 
which purchase was made with Mrs. Smith's money (FF/CL, p. 17; R. p. 1583). Between August 
1989 and March 1990, Mrs. Smith gave Vernon over $40,000 (FF/CL, p. 18; R. p. 1584; Exhibit 
265). Additionally, Mrs. Smith was making Vernon's child support payments and paying his office 
expenses. (FF/CL, p. 18; R. p. 1584; Tr. p. 272, L. 22). Also, see incidents reflecting Mrs. Smith's 
susceptibility set forth at pages 30 through 34 below. 
In the months prior to and subsequent to the Will's execution, the Magistrate found 
that Joseph and his family had a good relationship with. Mrs. Smith:  
According to the Magistrate's findings: 
There is no evidence that Joseph and his family were estranged from 
his mother at the time she executed her holographic will. In fact, all 
of the evidence, up until late summer, early fall 1992 (more than two 
years later), proved that Victoria enjoyed a good and loving 
relationship with Joseph and his family. See Exs. 25, 265, 266, 267, 
268. She continued participating in family gatherings and sending 
cards and gifts. There is no evidence to suggest that some 
estrangement between Joseph and his mother had anything to do with 
her uncommunicated decision to disinherit him or his family. There 
was no estrangement during the relevant time frame. 
FF/CL, p. 18; R. p. 1584. Also, see Tr. p. 487, L. 6-10. 
According to the Magistrate, Vernon is responsible for Joseph's and Mrs. Smith's  
subsequent estrangement: In late 1991, nearly two years after execution of the Will, Victoria 
terminated Joseph as manager of her properties, and her relationship with Joseph and his family 
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spiraled downward and into estrangement (FF/CL, p. 8; R. p. 1574; Tr. p. 74, L. 8). There is evidence 
by the testimony of Mrs. Smith's granddaughter Kate Laxson and Father Faucher that Vernon was 
instrumental in orchestrating this estrangement (Tr. p. 448, L. 9-13 and Tr. p. 409, L. 13-18.) As 
found by the Magistrate: 
In early fall 1992, over two years after Victoria executed her 
holographic will, something drastic happened to the relationship 
between his mother and Joseph and his family. Based on the 
evidence and Vernon's behavior in court, the Court concludes that 
Vernon actively engaged in damaging his mother's feelings about 
Joseph's family. Vernon's negative influence on his mother resulted 
in isolation from her family. 
FF/CL, p. 19; R. p. 1585 (emphasis added). 
And: 
The Court concludes from the evidence and testimony, Vernon was 
actively alienating his mother from Joseph's family in an attempt to 
isolate her. The Court further concludes that Victoria did not 
disinherit Joseph H. Smith because they were estranged when she 
made the will or that she thought he was a "thief and a liar". 
FF/CL, p. 20; R. p. 1586 (emphasis in original). 
The Magistrate found there was an absence of evidence explaining Mrs. Smith's  
disinheritance of her daughter Mrs. Converse:  Although Mrs. Smith disapproved of Mrs. 
Converse' adoption of "born again" Christianity, "that disapproval does not explain why she chose 
to completely disinherit Victoria Converse on February 14, 1990" (FF/CL, p. 20) (R. p. 1586). Up 
until at least December 1999, Mrs. Smith continued to recognize the Converse children's birthdays 
and Christmas with checks. See Exhibits 265 through 268. Two months prior to the date of the Will, 
Mrs. Smith gave Mrs. Converse a $3000 gift (Tr. p. 69, L. 11 to p. 70, L. 2; Exhibit 205); in 
December 1990, ten months after the Will was executed, Mrs. Smith gave her daughter a $3000 
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monetary gift. ( Id; Tr. p. 239, L.4 to p. 240, L.2). 
According to the Magistrate, the relevance of Father Faucher's "credible" testimony  
(R. p.1586) ran to three elements of undue influence: (1) Mrs. Smith's susceptibility to Vernon's 
undue influence (2) Vernon's opportunity, to influence, and (3) disposition to engage in such  
conduct. Father W. Thomas Faucher was Mrs. Smith's priest for thirteen years and had known the 
Smith family since 1950 (FF/CL, p. 20; R. p. 1586; Tr. p. 401, L. 20-23). His testimony may be 
summarized as follows: 
In 2007, Father Faucher approached Mrs. Smith respecting a "substantial memorial gift" to 
the Church (Tr. p. 405, L. 3-13). Mrs. Smith responded that she would like to make such a donation. 
Id. Father Faucher recommended that she discuss the matter with Vernon, knowing that Vernon was 
involved in his mother's financial decisions. Thereafter, according to Father Faucher, Mrs. Smith, 
a regular attendee at Sunday services, stopped attending church. Father Faucher began calling her 
house and was advised that Mrs. Smith was ill but not available for him to administer the sacrament 
of the sick. Father Faucher called Vernon's office several times without reaching him. Finally, he 
arranged to have coffee with Vernon who advised that there would be no charitable contribution. 
He never saw or spoke to Mrs. Smith during the remaining six years of her life (Tr. pp. 401-413; 
FF/CL p. 21; R. p. 1587) This incident reflects Mrs. Smith's susceptibility to Vernon's influence 
as well as Vernon's "disposition" to exploit this susceptibility by isolating Mrs. Smith. 
According to Father Faucher, Mrs. Smith "had a deep appreciation for strong men" (Tr. p. 
420, L. 18 to p. 421, L.2). The Magistrate found that Vernon "is a formidable and persuasive man" 
who conceded that his mother followed his advice (FF/CL, p. 21; R. p. 1587). 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL  
(1) Referencing the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, which invalidated Vernon's 
conveyance of real property, whether the Notice of Appeal (R. 1517) was timely in view of 
immediate appealability of probate court orders which are "against the . conveyance of real 
property", per Idaho Code § 17-201(5) and Rule 83(a)(2)(F), I.R.C.P. See Motion for Partial 
Dismissal of Appeal and supporting brief, incorporated herein by reference, which this Court has 
previously denied. 
(2) In the event Respondent Joseph is the prevailing party in this appeal, whether he is 
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 15-8-208 and Rule 54(e)(2), I.R.C.P., 
on the grounds that the prosecution of this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law:  A recent decision of this Court is consistent with 
multiple Idaho decisions that an appellate court "will not disturb findings of fact that are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence". As to conclusions of law, these are "freely reviewed" and, 
thus, subject to the appellate court "drawing its own conclusions from the facts presented in the 
record". 
On review by this Court, a trial court's conclusions following a bench 
trial will be limited to a determination of whether the evidence 
supports the trial court's findings of fact, and whether those findings 
support the conclusions of law. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 148 Idaho 47, 50, 218 P.3d 391, 394 (2009). 
This Court will "liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in 
favor of the judgment entered, as it is within the province of the trial 
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and judge the 
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credibility of witnesses." Id; see also Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 
61, 190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008) (regarding findings of fact in view of the 
trial court's role as trier of fact). This Court will not disturb findings 
of fact on appeal that are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence at trial. Panike & Sons 
Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562, 565-66, 212 P.3d 992, 995-96 
(2009). Only erroneous findings will be set aside. Id. at 565, 212 P.3d 
at 995. Also, this Court has always held that its view of the facts will 
not be substituted for that of the trial court. See Weitz v. Green, 148 
Idaho 851, 857, 230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010). Finally, conclusions of 
law are freely reviewed by this Court, drawing its own conclusions 
from the facts presented in the record. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout 
Co., 146 Idaho 613, 619, 200 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2009). 
Green River Ranches, LLC, v. Silva Land Co., LLC, 162 Idaho 385, 397 P.3d 1144, 1148 (2017), 
quoting Watkins Co, LLC, v. Storm, 152 Idaho 531, 535, 272 P.3d 503, 507 (2012) (emphasis added). 
In the probate context, this same standard of review prevails both as to the issue of undue 
influence and whether the presumption of undue influence should be invoked. See Estate of Conway, 
152 Idaho 933, 277 P.3d 380, 385 (2012). 
Summary judgment:  Respondent Joseph concurs with the standard of review for summary 
judgments set forth in Appellant's Brief (p. 4). That is, the issue presented, i.e., the scope of the 
Power of Attorney, is a pure question of law and does not implicate questions of material fact. 
Evidentiary rulings:  Any error in the admission of evidence that does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties will be disregarded, i.e., an "abuse of discretion" standard is applied. 
Howell v. Eastern Idaho Railroad, Inc., 135 Idaho 733, 24 P.3 d 50, 55 (2001); I.R.E., Rule 103. The 
appellate review of a trial court's decision as to the relevancy of evidence is a de novo review. Id. 
RESULT SOUGHT AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT  
Result sought:  As a preliminary issue, Respondent Joseph seeks a dismissal of this appeal 
as it pertains to the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. The motion to dismiss (previously 
denied by the Court) is sought based upon Appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 
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Assuming the motion to dismiss remains denied, Respondent Joseph seeks an affirmance of 
the entry of partial summary judgment against Appellant Vernon, which concluded that he lacked the 
authority to make pre-death conveyances of Estate property. Respondent Joseph also seeks an 
affirmance of the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. p. 1567) that 
the subject holographic Will was invalidated by the undue influence of its sole beneficiary Vernon, 
Mrs. Smith's undisputed attorney and fiduciary. 
Summary of argument:  
(1) Partial summary judgment: 
 The Magistrate correctly invalidated Vernon's 2012 
conveyance of Mrs. Smith's assets to his LLC in its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. 
Mrs. Smith's 2008 POA (Exhibit 4), did not include gifting authority and, therefore, did not authorize 
Vernon's 2012 conveyance to his limited liability company, VHS Properties, LLC. (Exhibit 5) As 
the Magistrate ruled as a matter of law: 
Because the 2008 Power of Attorney did not contain a specific, 
express grant of authority to gift the Victoria H. Smith property, 
Vernon K Smith had no authority to gift her property to anyone or to 
himself. 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 12 (bolded in original), citing Idaho Code § 15-12-
201(1)(b). (R. p. 1060) 
That is, there is no genuine issue of material fact which requires litigation. Rule 56(c), 
I.R.C.P. The Estate assets remain intact and are subject to probate following Mrs. Smith's demise 
in 2013. 
(2) Existence of undue influence: 
 Whether by invocation of the presumption or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the holographic Will was procured by undue influence: the Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which invalidated the holographic Will, should be affirmed 
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based upon: (1) upon the existence of "substantial and competent evidence" of undue influence. (2) 
appellate deference to the Magistrate's weighing of conflicting evidence, and (3) its judging the 
credibility of witnesses. Watkins Co., LLC, v. Storms, 152 Idaho at 535, 272 P.3d at 507 (2012). 
THE MAGISTRATE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT CORRECTLY RULED,  
AS A MATTER OF LAW,- THAT VERNON'S PRE-DEATH CONVEYANCE 
OF ESTATE ASSETS TO HIS LLC WAS INVALID IN THE ABSENCE  
OF GIFTING AUTHORITY IN MRS. SMITH'S POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
Vernon, the sole principal of VHS Properties, LLC, was a litigant before the Magistrate  
which conferred jurisdiction to invalidate Vernon's deed to VHS as exceeding his Power of 
Attorney:  The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the "conclusive" power of probate courts to 
adjudicate questions of title to real property as between Estate heirs. Pincock v. Pocatello Gold, 100 
Idaho 325, 597 P.2d 211, 215 (1979). 
The evidence is undisputed that prior to Mrs. Smith's death Vernon, utilizing his Power of 
Attorney, conveyed the Estate real property to his limited liability company, VHS Properties, LLC. 
Vernon became the sole owner of this LLC when, the next day, he conveyed Mrs. Smith's 
membership in the LLC to himself. See Appellant Brief, page 13, referencing "R 74-77". 
As a result of this transfer of real estate, Vernon saw himself as the recipient of a gift from his 
mother, although transferred to himself by his invocation of her Power of Attorney, i.e., "[s]he wanted 
me to have the entire Estate, and I chose to take it by deed transfer as opposed to testamentary 
disposition" (Tr. p. 352, L. 5-12). As is observed in Appellant's Brief: "Vernon reasoned that these 
transfers were consistent with his mother's intent that he inherit her property and also serve an estate 
planning and tax purpose". Id., p. 13. In ruling upon the validity of Vernon's transfer pursuant to the 
Power of Attorney, the Magistrate was adjudicating and settling the heirs' interest in the subject real 
property. Pincock v. Pocatello Gold, 597 P.2d at 215. Such adjudication was clearly within the 
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Magistrate's subject matter jurisdiction. 
Respondent Joseph's standing_to challenge Appellant Vernon's 2012 conveyance of Mrs.  
Smith's real property: 
 Utilizing the 2008 Power of Attorney ("POA") (Exhibit 4), Appellant 
Vernon conveyed the entirety of Mrs. Smith's assets to his limited liability company, VHS Properties, 
LLC (Exhibit 5; R pp. 1577-83). Under the authority of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act 
("UPAA"), Idaho Code § 15-12-116(1), respondent Joseph had standing to challenge the validity of 
the conveyance in his motion for summary judgment: "The following persons may petition a court 
to construe a power of attorney or review the agent's conduct and grant appropriate relief: . . (d) 
The principal's spouse, parent or descendant; (e) an individual who would qualify as a presumptive 
heir of the principal . ." In her summary judgment order, the Magistrate cited this statute which 
acknowledged Joseph's standing, as both a descendant and presumptive heir, to request the Court 
review Vernon's conduct under the POA and "grant appropriate relief' (R. p. 1058). 
Ignoring the standing which a "descendant" or "presumptive heir" has under the UPAA, 
Vernon argues that only a "living principal" can invoke the remedies imposed by the UPAA: "It is 
clear that those provisions, by design, are intended for the benefit of a living principal . . .The 
time for Joseph to have sought such judicial relief was while Victoria was still alive )3 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 16, 17). This argument trashes the plain language of the statute and severely 
dilutes the protections afforded a principal by limiting such protections to a pre-death invocation. 
The Official Comment to § 15-12-116 confirms that section (1) "sets forth broad categories 
of persons who have standing to petition the court for construction of the power of attorney or review 
the agent's conduct ." The succeeding section (§ 15-12-117) confirms the standing of a 
presumptive heir or descendant to challenge an agent's conduct under a POA, whether the principal 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16 
is living or dead: "An agent that violates this chapter is liable to the principal or the principal's 
successor in interest . . ." (emphasis added). 
Appellant's cited case law fails to support the contention that an agent's abuses cannot 
be addressed after the death of the principal:  Vernon cites In re Burke Estate, Del.Ch. Lexis 121 
(2016) as authority for the proposition that petitions for judicial relief challenging an agent's actions 
can only be made during the lifetime of the principal. First, this decision, by the Court of Chancery, 
has been superseded by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Burke v. Burke, 082417 DESC. 48 (2017). 
Secondly, this case has no relevance to the case at bench. In Burke, the agent in a power of attorney 
was also the residuary beneficiary under the subject will. Therefore, the proceeds in question would 
go to her in any event, i.e., there was no justiciable controversy. Thirdly, the Chancery Court decision 
cited a Delaware statute in footnote 14 which appears to track Idaho's UPAA and provides that an 
agent is required to present an accounting when so requested by the beneficiary or personal 
representative "upon the death of the principal". See Idaho Code § 15.42-114(8). 
The doctrine of res judicata did not bar Joseph's motion for partial summary judgment  
'invalidating Vernon's conveyance of Mrs. Smith's assets to his limited liability company: In 
general terms, Judge Bieter's treatment of Joseph's petition alleging fiduciary breach was neither 
dispositive nor did it involve the same issues as Joseph's summary judgment motion. Joseph's 
petition sought damages for Vernon's fiduciary breach in the handling of Estate assets; Joseph also 
sought an accounting (R. p. 271). By contrast, in the summary judgment motion, he alleged that 
Vernon acted outside the power of attorney and sought an order that Mrs. Smith's assets be 
transferred back to the Estate. 
More to the point from a res judicata standpoint, Judge Bieter did not rule but "reserved" a 
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decision: "So let's talk about when we can try that. I'm going to reserve decision on the motion to 
dismiss Counts I and III [breach of fiduciary duty and accounting] but to let you (sic) contest the will" 
(Tr. P. 15, L. 20 to p. 16, L. 15) (bracketed material explanatory). 
The elements for the application of res judicata do not exist here. First, there was no "valid 
final judgment" which preceded the summary judgment proceedings. Secondly, the issue presented 
in Joseph's petition, i.e., fiduciary breach in the mishandling of Estate assets, was different than the 
summary judgment issue, i.e., the validity of Vernon's gift of all Estate assets to his limited liability 
company. See Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379 (2003). 
Vernon's invocation of the "coupled with an interest" exclusion is both irrelevant and 
inapplicable to his "interest" as merely an expectant heir: 
 Section 15-12-103 (1) of the UPAA 
excludes from the Act "a power to the extent it is coupled with an interest . . ." , citing as an 
example "a power given to or for the benefit of a creditor . . ." 
First, the "coupled with an interest" provision goes to the revocability of a POA, not the scope 
of the POA, which is the issue here. As noted by the Magistrate in her Order Denying 
Reconsideration: 
"[I]n order that a power may be irrevocable because coupled with 
an interest, it is necessary that the interest shall be in the subject 
matter of the power, and not in the proceeds which will arise from 
the exercise of the power". 
Id, p. 17 (R. p. 1346), quoting What Constitutes Power Coupled with an Interest within Rule as to 
Termination of Agency, 28 A.L.R. 1243 §2(a). 
Secondly, Vernon's interest in Mrs. Smith's Estate in 2012, at the time he made the transfer 
to his limited liability company, was a mere expectant interest, i.e., a prospective heir who had no 
enforceable interest against the assets of the Estate. As observed by the Magistrate: 
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Thus, in order for the agent's power to be "coupled with an interest", 
the agent must have a property interest in the thing which is the subject 
of the agency [authority cited]. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., did not have a 
property interest in the subject matter of the 2008 Power of Attorney. 
Order Denying Reconsideration, p. 18 (R. p. 1347). 
Even if Vernon did hold an enforceable interest in the Estate, i.e., a "coupled interest", this 
feature does not expand the scope of the POA to endow him with gifting powers. 
The Magistrate's invalidation of 2012 Vernon's "gifts" to his LLC is based upon the 
ineffective Power of Attorney:  Based upon Joseph's standing, the applicability of the UPAA, and 
the absence of gifting authority in the POA, the Magistrate correctly concluded that the 2012 
conveyances of Mrs. Smith's entire estate to Vernon's limited liability company were invalid as a 
matter of law: "Nothing in this power of attorney specifically or expressly authorizes the holder to 
gift Victoria H. Smith's property" (R. p. 1052). 
And: 
The Court grants partial summary judgment to Joseph H. Smith. 
finding there is no dispute of any fact material to this issue. The Court 
sets aside all "gifts or transfers Victoria H. Smith's property made 
pursuant to the 2008 Power of Attorney, effective immediately. The 
Court further orders all property returned to the estate and that no party 
transfer any of that property without order of this Court. Finally, the 
Court orders Vernon K. Smith. Jr. provide an accounting, receipts, etc. 
to the Court within 30 days of this Order. 
R. p. 1065 
By the Magistrate's Order of Partial Summary judgment, Mrs. Smith's property was retained 
by her Estate, to be distributed in accordance with prospective probate orders. 
THE ELEMENTS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE NECESSARY 
RELIANCE ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Elements of undue influence:  The existence of undue influence is determined through proof 
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of four elements: (a) a testator who is susceptible to undue influence; (b) an opportunity to exert undue 
influence on the testator; (c) the disposition and character of the beneficiary as consistent with a person 
who would exert undue influence; and (d) a testamentary result indicating undue influence. Gmeiner 
v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 6, 592 P.2d 57, 62 (1979); In re the Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 938, 277 
P.3d 380 (2012); Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 389 P.3d 961, 966 (2017). 
Alienation and isolation: classic signposts of decedent' susceptibility and of Vernon's  
opportunity and disposition to unduly influence: In Gmeiner, Court noted two circumstances 
which support the existence of undue influence and which exist in this record, i.e., beneficiary-induced 
alienation of family members and isolation of the testatrix: 
The court will look closely at situations where the recipient of a deed 
or bequest has apparently been responsible for alienating the affections 
of the testator-grantor from the other members of his or her family. The 
situation is further exacerbated if the grantee has isolated the grantor 
from all contact with family or with disinterested third parties. 
Id, 100 Idaho at 8 (emphasis added). ' 
Necessary reliance on factual inferences: The Gmeiner Court recognized the long held view 
that "direct evidence as to undue influence is rarely obtainable and, hence, a court must determine the 
issue of undue influence by inferences drawn from all the facts and circumstances" (Id., 100 Idaho at 
5). Also see In re Lunders ' Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 263 P.2d 1002, 1006, (1953) citing In re Hannam's 
Estate, 236 P.2d 208, 210 (1951). As opined in King v. McDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 410 P.2d 969 
(1965): 
In Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419, 93 P.2d 1, 5 we held that in order 
to show undue influence it is not necessary to prove circumstances of 
either actual domination or coercion; that the only positive and 
affirmative proof required is of facts and circumstances from which 
undue influence may be reasonably inferred, for instance, that the 
beneficiary was active in the preparation and execution of the will. 
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Id., 410 P.2d at 973. 
As one Court observed, it is "universally recognized" that "one who seeks to use undue 
influence does so in privacy". In re Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419, 429, 93 P. 2d 1, 5 (1939) 
(quoting Blackman v. Edsall, 68 P. 790, 792 (Colo. 1902). Based upon the usual lack of direct 
evidence of undue influence, the courts have recognized the utility of circumstantial evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE 
PRESUMPTION THAT THE DECEDENT'S WILL 
WAS THE RESULT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
Conditions creating the presumption:  In order for there to be a presumption, two conditions 
must exist: (a) a fiduciary relationship between the testator and the beneficiary; and (b) the 
beneficiary/fiduciary must have had some role in the preparation of the Will: 
[A] "presumption of undue influence" arises from proof of the exercise 
of a confidential relation between the testator and such a beneficiary, 
"coupled with activity on the part of the latter in the preparation of the 
will. The confidential relation alone is not sufficient. There must be 
activity on the part of the beneficiary in the matter of the preparation 
of the will. 
In re Lunders ' Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 263 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1953), citing Estate ofHiggins, 104 
P. 6, 8 (Cal. 1909) (emphasis added). 
By Vernon's own testimony, he witnessed Mrs. Smith's execution of the Will and offered 
advice as respects its safekeeping (Tr. p. 209, L. 20 to p. 212, L. 5). He also acknowledges his role 
as Mrs. Smith's attorney and fiduciary. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 8 (R. p. 1056). 
(a) Fiduciary role: The evidence is undisputed that appellant Vernon was his mother's sole 
attorney and fiduciary since 1976. In 2012, by reason of a 2008 POA in his favor, drafted by him 
(Exhibit 4) and executed by Mrs. Smith (at age 95), Vernon transferred all her assets to an LLC owned 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 21 
by him. (Exhibit 5) As the Court found in the underlying summary judgment proceedings: 
Vernon K. Smith, Jr., was the Attorney of Record for his father's estate 
continuously since 1976. According to Vernon K. Smith, Jr., he acted 
exclusively for Victoria H. Smith's benefit in managing and preserving 
all matters of ownership of all her interests. He admitted he had a 
fiduciary relationship with his mother. Thus Victoria H. Smith's estate 
include Vernon K Smith, Sr.'s estate and assets. 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, p. 8. (R. p. 1056) 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, the attorney/client relationship "is one of trust, binding 
an attorney to the utmost good faith in fair dealing with his client, and obligating the attorney to 
discharge that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty and fidelity. Blough v. Wellman, 
132 Idaho 424, 426, 974 P.2d 70 {1999). 
The record is replete with legal advice from Vernon to his mother which, inter alia, adversely 
impacted Joseph's relationship with his mother: (1) the legal controversy surrounding the Hamer 
property (Tr. pp. 200-204); (2) the issue of the well easement {Tr. pp. 237, 238; pp. 159-160); (3) the 
dispute over the fence repairs (Tr. pp. 243, 244); (4) and advising his mother respecting Joseph's 
refusal to participate in the foreclosure of his ex-wife's Raymond St. property (Tr. p. 164, L. 6-21; p. 
236, L. 9-25). See generally below, pp. 30, 31. 
Vernon has placed great reliance on Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175P.2d 692 
(1946). There the Court ruled that the mere fact that the beneficiary was the testator's attorney was 
insufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence against the beneficiary. Swaringen is 
distinguishable from the case at bench for three reasons: (1) the beneficiary/attorney did not participate 
in the preparation of the will; (2) the testator had the benefit of independent legal advice in the drafting 
of the will; and (3) the undisputed evidence was that the testator was "strong-minded" and not 
susceptible to being influenced (Id., 167 Idaho at 248). In contrast, as testified by Father Faucher, Mrs. 
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Smith "had a deep appreciation for strong men" and "had a desire to please" such figures (Tr. p. 420, 
L. 18 to p. 421, L. 2). 
Likewise, Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 389 P.3d 961 (2017) has no application here 
{Appellant Brief, p. 23). In Green involving an amendment to a trust, the grantors' attorney prepared 
an amendment to the trust which made James, one of five siblings, the sole beneficiary upon the 
grantors' deaths. The other siblings alleged the amendment was the result of beneficiary James' undue 
influence which influence was enabled by James' status as a fiduciary. In affirming the district court's 
summary judgment in favor of James, the alleged undue influencer, the Supreme Court held that 
James' fiduciary duty as a director of the family corporation was an insufficient connection to the 
execution of the donative instrument (trust amendment) to raise a presumption of undue influence {389 
P.3d at 968), i.e., the beneficiary James was not a fiduciary to the grantors, his parents. 
The case of Gill v. Gill, 254 S.E.2d 122 (Va. 1979) is likewise distinguishable. In Gill, the 
beneficiary did not have a fiduciary relationship with the testator and was not present when the will 
was drafted. Also, there were two witnesses to the will. 
(b) Vernon's testamentary participation:  A second condition precedent to invocation 
of the presumption of undue influence is that the beneficiary have some role in the preparation of the 
will. 
As set forth above (page 5,6), Vernon testified that he witnessed Mrs. Smith's execution of the 
Will per her request and counseled her to keep it in her rolltop desk at home (Tr. pp. 209, 210). 
Mrs. Smith, who was not an attorney, used testamentary language and concepts which typically 
originate only from the mind of an attorney. The Will provides (in its entirety): 
In the event of my death I give all my property, real and personal, to my 
son Vernon K. Smith, Jr., with the right to serve as Executor without 
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bond. I have given my son Joseph H. Smith real and personal property 
in my life time (sic). I have given my daughter, Victoria Converse, 
personal property in my life time (sic). Holographic will dated 
February 14, 1990. 
Exhibit 208 
That is, the following phrases have a special legal gloss: "executor without bond", "real and 
personal property" and "holographic will". The acknowledgment that Vernon's siblings have already 
received something anticipates (erroneously) the issue ofpretermitted heirship, not an issue that readily 
springs into the lay mind.3  
Vernon's "fingerprints" are all over the holographic will. The Magistrate correctly concluded 
that Mrs. Smith "had some legal advice in [the Will's] preparation" (FF/CL, p. 10; R. p. 1576). 
(c) Vernon's post-Will participation in testamentary matters:  Vernon drafted a power 
of attorney for his appointment which contained the following concluding paragraph bizarrely 
referencing Mrs. Smith's testamentary intentions: 
This Durable Power of Attorney is irrevocable and shall remain in full 
force and effect, having been coupled with adequate consideration, and 
shall not be affected, altered or impaired by the event of my death or 
disability, and shall continue in effect for all time, as it has been my 
long-standing intention and desire that my son, Vernon K Smith, Jr., 
shall be the sole and exclusive heir of my entire estate, as I have so 
declared openly in the past many years, because of his commitment, 
dedication, and devotion to my best interests, welfare and financial well 
being. 
Exhibit 4, p. 2. (emphasis added) 
The POA (Exhibit 4) drafted by Vernon (Tr. p. 351, L. 3-5), further implicates him in the 
testamentary affairs of his mother which supports the imposition of the presumption of undue 
3 
 Prior to 1971, "pretermitted" heir included a living intestate heir who was omitted from the 
will. Subsequent to 1971, a pretermitted heir is an heir at law who was born subsequent to the execution 
of the will. Idaho Code § 15-2-302. That is, Joseph/Converse would not be deemed pretermitted. 
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influence. More significantly, the POA (a document actually signed by Mrs. Smith) omits reference 
to the holographic Will but speaks of her "long standing intention" to make Vernon her sole heir. By 
contrast, the transfer document, drafted and signed only by Vernon (Exhibit 5; Tr. 349, p. 2-3) which 
conveyed all of Mrs. Smith's assets to Vernon's LLC, makes specific reference to the holographic will. 
This conduct is relevant to the element of "disposition", i.e., Vernon's propensity to unduly 
influence is exemplified by his abuse of the 2008 POA. See discussion regarding "disposition" below, 
pp. 34, 35. Upon the realization that Joseph was undertaking a serious challenge to the validity of the 
holographic Will, Vernon requested that (1) the Court ignore the Will (which he had previously 
proffered to probate) and (2) the Court confirm his ownership of Estate assets notwithstanding his ultra 
vices use of the 2008 Power of Attorney to gift the entire Estate to his limited liability company, 
leaving the Estate with no assets. As he argued in summary judgment briefing: 
. . . Vernon has never conceded or waived the fact that there are 
no assets to be found in any estate to be opened, as he has disclosed 
all assets were transferred on July 4, 2012 and there would be no 
assets to inventory in any potential estate that may or may not be 
formed. 
R. p. 986. 
Vernon's arrogant disregard of Mrs. Smith's testamentary aspirations set forth in the 2008 
POA underscores his "disposition" to engage in undue influence. Vernon testified: 
Q. BY MR ELLIS: I am trying to understand how your conveyance 
to the LLC and then the conveyance of your mother's membership to 
yourself is consistent with the power of attorney which talks about her 
testamentary intentions. 
A. She wanted me to have the entire estate, and I chose to take it 
by deed transfer as opposed to the testamentary disposition. 
Tr. p. 352, L. 5-12. 
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VERNON HAS FAILED TO REBUT THE  
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
By the presumption of undue influence, Vernon is burdened with producing evidence of the 
non-existence of at least one of the four elements of undue influence. Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 
734, 718 P.2d 1172 (1986). Although Vernon has asserted that he has produced that "quantum" of 
evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption (Appellant Brief, p.28), he failed to identify that evidence. 
Vernon has presented insufficient evidence to rebut "at least one" of the four elements of 
undue influence: (1) "susceptibility", (2) "opportunity", (3) Vernon's "disposition", and (4) the 
testamentary "result" of the holographic Will. Id. That is, there is an absence of rebuttal evidence 
from which the trier of fact could "reasonably" conclude that even one of the elements of undue 
influence does not exist. Id. 
Vernon argues that his status as sole beneficiary is the natural "result" of Mrs. Smith's negative 
feelings toward Joseph and his sister Vicky (Appellant Brief, p. 37). However, the evidence, of Mrs. 
Smith's disappointment with Joseph arose after the execution of the Will and, in any event, was 
orchestrated by Vernon. See record cited below at pages 30 - 34. As to Ms. Converse, the record is 
barren of evidence indicating Mrs. Smith's antipathy toward her daughter. 
The correspondence between Joseph's family and the testatrix commencing in 1992 (two years 
after execution of the holographic Will) reflects a deterioration in their relationship. There is no 
evidence that this deterioration existed pre-Will (pre-1990) which diminishes the evidentiary weight 
of such post-Will correspondence, if not its actual relevance. Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 
757 P.2d 1222, 1229 (1988). 
In any event, such deterioration was the result of Vernon's efforts at alienating Joseph's family 
from the testatrix. The evidence in the record of Vernon's successful efforts at alienation is set forth 
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below (pp. 30-31). Prior to execution of the Will in 1990, the evidence supports the conclusion that 
the testatrix and Joseph's family experienced a normal familial relationship. See especially Group 
Exhibits 2 and 25 which are greeting cards exchanged and family photographs. 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
 
SUPPORTS THE EXISTENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE!  
Stopgap utility of holographic wills: 
 The legislated emergence of the holographic will, 
recognized in most jurisdictions, was not intended to promote a do-it-yourself trend in will drafting. 
Rather, it was intended to provide individuals with a testamentary option where a terminal illness or 
exigent circumstances prevented access to counsel and the drafting of a conventional, printed will. 
As testified by Lyman Belnap, an attorney/expert called by respondent Joseph: 
The instances where I have been able to have input on holographic wills 
it's usually been a situation where people were leaving town and no time 
to sit down and do a formal will. Something in the interim to carry them 
until they could get back to town so they didn't have absolutely nothing 
as they traveled. 
Tr., p. 221, L. 5 15. 
In order to discourage fraudulent authorship, given the absence of signatory witnesses, the 
typical authorizing statute, e.g., Idaho Code § 15-2-503, requires that the holographic will be "in the 
handwriting of the testator". Id. 
Quoting a 1933 case, In re Wallace's Will, 265 N.Y.S. 898, which, in turn, quoted from an 
undated English case (Carroll v. Norton, 3 Bradf. Sur 291, 318), appellant Vernon argues: "There is 
always difficulty in attacking a holographic will, the presumptions being very strong in its favor". 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 24). With all due respect to New York and English jurists, the legitimacy of a 
4
The Appellant Brief focuses on Vernon's rebuttal burden but, tellingly, fails to identify how 
Joseph's evidence of undue influence is neither competent nor substantial. 
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testatrix' handwritten will does not rest on it being an indicia of the free will of the testator. Rather, 
it has to do with discouraging fraudulently signed wills. 
In order to confirm a signatory's identity, a will in her "handwriting" (LC. § 15-2-503) exists 
as such confli nation, in lieu of the two witnesses required in the conventional, printed will. That is, 
in order to discourage fraudulent wills, the Idaho Legislature imposed the requirement oftwo witnesses 
(LC. § 15-2-502) or, in the alternative, the requirement of a testatrix' "handwriting". Attesting 
witnesses, with the opportunity to observe a testator's demeanor (and that of the influencer, if 
present), are more effective in discouraging undue influence than an unwitnessed, handwritten will. 
In the latter case, the undue influencer has the opportunity to consummate his evil work in the absence 
of witnesses. 
Susceptibility of the Testatrix to Undue Influence and Vernon's Exploitation 
thereof:  
Susceptibility: In its Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered on July 
19, 2016, the Magistrate made the following finding of fact: 
"In addition, Vernon K. Smith, Sr., Vernon K. Smith, Jr., Victoria 
Converse and Joseph H. Smith's father died at the age of 53 on May 2, 
1966. According to Vernon K. Smith, Jr., he acted exclusively for 
Victoria H. Smith's benefit in managing and preserving all matters of 
ownership of all of her interests. He admitted he had a fiduciary 
relationship with his mother." 
R. p. 1056. 
In the pleadings filed in this case, Vernon admitted that his mother depended upon his legal 
and financial advice and deferred to his decision-making with respect to the management of all her 
business affairs. He handled all aspects of his mother's financial affairs from 1971 up to her death in 
2013. Thus, in his Response & Objection to Petition for Formal Adjudication of Intestacy, he 
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admitted: "...as Respondent [Vernon] became the "Patriarch" for the family, after our Father died, 
as our Mother needed constant financial assistance..." R. p. 92 
And: 
"That from 1971 on, Vernon K. Smith, Jr., had been the sole 
responsible individual for the management and control of all assets and 
interests owned by Victoria H. Smith, including the formation of all 
leasehold interest, whether written or oral, all business decisions and all 
transactions and transfers of any kind undertaken, and all investments 
and acquisitions made..." 
Id., R. p. 94 
In fact, Vernon cited his complete control of his mother's financial affairs as justification for 
the 2012 conveyance of all of her property to a limited liability company of which Vernon's wife is 
now the sole member. Tr. p. 352, LL. 10-12. The Magistrate's Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment quotes the document Vernon prepared and signed which is entitled: Transfer, Conveyance 
and Sale of All Property Interests from Victoria H. Smith to VHS Properties, LLC. 
"WHEREAS: VKS Jr. has always been the sole source of all 
management, maintenance, financial means, operation and control of 
all assets of Victoria H. Smith, beginning after his Father's death, and 
especially since and after his becoming an Attorney in 1971..." (p. 1) 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgments 
 (R. p.1053). 
The Gmeiner Court identified "isolation" and "alienation" as classic red flags of undue 
influence. The sudden disruption of cordial family relations between Victoria and Joseph and Sharon 
is strong evidence of Vernon's disposition to utilize Mrs. Smith's susceptibility to his influence, i.e., 
his actions to keep the holographic Will intact and preserve his status as sole heir. 
The evidence is undisputed that for at least twenty-five years prior to the execution of the 
5An almost identical statement is also included in the "Assignment and Transfer of Membership 
Interest of: Victoria Smith in VHS Properties, LLC to Vernon K. Smith, Jr. confirming him to be the 
100% member thereof' Exhibit 5 ( page 7 of its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment). R. p. 1055. 
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holographic Will, Joe and Sharon Smith took Victoria for grocery and other shopping, and drove her 
to her doctor, dentist and accountant appointments, to social events, and to church events (Tr. p. 171, 
L.11; p. 173, L.20; p. 475, L. 17; p. 476, L. 11). For twenty-five years prior to execution of the Will, 
and up to the time of his mother's death, Joseph and Sharon lived only 600 feet away from Victoria's 
home. (Tr. p. 168, L. 11 to p. 170, L. 22; p. 475, L. 11-16). Victoria socialized with Joseph and Sharon 
and their children, including family dinners, attending weddings and baby showers and remembered 
birthdays and special occasions. (Tr. p. 476, L.19 to p. 486, L.10). See Group Exhibits 2 and 25, 
greeting cards and photographs, respectively. Also, Mrs. Smith made several loans to Joseph and 
monetary gifts to her three adult children, Vernon, Joseph and Vicky Converse (Tr. p. 65, L.9 - p. 69, 
L.19). 
Vernon's exploitation of Mrs. Smith's susceptibility: But then, commencing in 1990 just shortly 
after the Will's execution, Vernon created disruptions, causing a deterioration and breakdown in the 
relationship between Joseph and his mother. (Tr. p. 39, L.23 - 40, L.4; p. 74, L.12-14; p. 88, L.7-14; 
p. 109, L.19 -110, L.15; p. 173, L.21 - 175:16; 487:11-17). Vernon himself admitted that the 
relationship between Victoria and Joseph deteriorated after the Will was executed. (Tr. p. 341, L. 12-
17). Vernon's disruptive conduct included: 
(a) Implicating Joseph in Vernon's ex-wife's foreclosure sale. Vernon asked Joseph to 
bid in the foreclosure proceedings for his ex-wife's residence; using Victoria's money. Joseph refused 
to participate in the scheme. Vernon informed Victoria that by Joseph's refusal, he was being 
"disloyal" to the family. (Tr. p. 162, L. 3 to p. 164 L. 21; p. 369, L. 4-9). 
(b) Impugning Joseph's faun management skills: As part of his duties as on-site 
manager of his mother's farm property, Joseph oversaw the home tenant's repair of fences. In 1991, 
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shortly after Vernon expressed his discontent with Joseph's management, Victoria relieved Joseph of 
all management duties and turned them over to Vernon. (Tr. p. 160, L.8 to p. 162, L.2; p. 81, LA6 to 
p. 82, L.11). 
(c) Disparagement of Joseph' s well easement: In 1992, Joseph applied for a home equity 
loan. The bank requested that Joseph obtain a well easement to legalize his right to draw water from 
his mother's well. Joseph asked his mother to sign the easement, which she did. Vernon learned that 
Victoria had signed the well easement, and soon after that, Victoria told Joseph that Vernon had 
objected to the easement, and she demanded the return of the easement document (Tr. p. 159, L.3 to 
p. 160, L.7). 
(d) Hamer lawsuit. In 1992, Vernon asked Joseph to sign some legal documents, 
pertaining to Mrs Smith's Hamer farmland. Joseph told his mother that he wanted an attorney to look 
them over before he signed them because he did not understand them. While Vernon waited in the car, 
Mrs. Smith came into the home and retrieved the documents. (Tr. p. 487, L.18 to p. 489, L. 5). After 
this event, Joseph and Sharon had little communication with Joseph's mother, although she lived only 
600 feet away. (Tr. p. 489, L. 6 - 15). 
(e) Vernon's control over Victoria's charitable gifting. A clear example of Victoria's 
susceptibility to Vernon's influence was Vernon's overriding Mrs. Smith's expressed interest in making 
a gift to her church. 
Victoria was a member of St. Mary's Catholic Church. She had served on the Altar Society and 
other activities for the church since the 1950's, and was a regular attendee at weekly church services. 
Father Faucher became pastor of the church in 2002. (Tr. p. 402, L.19 to p. 403, L. 25). Since Victoria 
did not drive, Vernon would bring her to Sunday services until the winter of 2007. (Tr. p. 404, L. 1-16). 
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Father Faucher testified that he had a conversation with Victoria about making a substantial donation 
to the church as a memorial for herself and her husband, and Victoria said she would be very open to 
doing that. (Tr. p. 404, L.17 to p. 405, L.13). Father Faucher told her that before she made a decision 
she should discuss it with Vernon. (Tr. p. 408. L.17 to p. 409, L.10). Within a week or two, Victoria 
stopped attending St. Mary's Church, and Father Faucher never saw her again. (Tr. p. 409, L.11-24). 
Although Victoria was a devout Catholic and member of St. Mary's for over 60 years, she had no 
contact with the church for the last six years of her life. 
Father Faucher attempted to contact Victoria but was never allowed to speak to her. When 
Vernon finally agreed to meet with him in fall of 2007 or early 2008, Vernon told Father Faucher that 
there would not be any memorial gift to the church. (Tr. p. 409, L.25 to p. 412, L. 24). According to 
Father Faucher Mrs. Smith "had a deep appreciation for strong men". (Tr. p. 420, L.18-24). 
(f) Victoria's 1991 affidavit (Exhibit 269) reflects a degree of susceptibility to Vernon's  
wishes: 
 Unfortunately, Victoria is not with us to provide the setting and confirm the authorship of this 
affidavit. The language, "[nod one tells me who will inherit my property" is helpful to Respondent on 
the issue of susceptibility. On the other hand, the Idaho Supreme Court recognizes that the style of 
undue influencers is not to dictate a testamentary result to the victim. More often, the desired result is 
obtained through "cajolery" and "flattery" (In re Estate of Randall, 60 Idaho 419, 429, 93 P.2d 1, 5 
(1939). 
The affidavit tends to support the existence of susceptibility: (1) the affidavit was signed at the 
request of Vernon or his attorney. Complying with this request may be viewed as being susceptible to 
Vernon wishes; (2) Victoria's willingness to lend Vernon $10,000 in response to his request does 
indicate a certain degree of susceptibility (Exhibit 269, p. 5); (3) also, evidence of Victoria's 
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susceptibility to Vernon's wishes is seen by "I permitted my son to take an existing building, owned 
by me, . . . and have use of it for his own partnership" (p. 6); (4) further evidence of Victoria's 
susceptibility is reflected in her loaning "all funds to my son to pay for any child or spousal support" 
(pp. 6, 7). Between 1989 and 1998, she paid Vernon $72,542 (Exhibit 65; Tr. p. 371:19-22). 
(g) Witness testimony respecting Victoria's personality sheds no light on the  
susceptibility issue and, in the case of witnesses Puckett and Dillworth, Vernon's employees, is further 
impaired by bias. (Tr. p. 133, L. 22 to p. 134, L. 5; p. 290, L. 20 -23). 
Opportunity to Influence the Testatrix: 
 Vernon's position as manager of his mother's 
financial and business affairs, together with the trust that she had in him, gave Vernon the opportunity 
to influence her in the disposition of her estate. (Tr. p. 334, L.11-18). Vernon served as her attorney 
from 1976 until she died in 2013. (Tr. p. 335, L.4-10). In addition, he testified that he was the only 
person present at his mother's residence when she signed her holographic Will, (Tr. p. 154, L.25 to p. 
155, L.25). 
Disposition to exert undue influence: 
 The following events and circumstances are consistent 
with Vernon's propensity to exert undue influence and consistent with the character of an undue 
influencer. 
(a) Active participation in the preparation of the Will (Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 8) and 
(Tr. p. 209, L.9 to p. 210, L. 19; p. 212, L.5-25) and injecting "legalese" into the Will unique to 
attorney-drafted documents (Exhibit 204). The Magistrate concluded that, with respect to the Will, 
Mrs. Smith had received "legal advice in its preparation" (FF/CL, p. 10; R. p. 1576) 
(b) Failure to counsel Mrs. Smith to engage in estate planning measures despite the fact 
that her estate exceeded $20,000,000 in value. See Exhibit 51 and attorney Belnap testimony, (Tr. p. 
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221, L.1 to p. 222, L. 9). That is, Vernon never recommended that Mrs. Smith retain an estate planner, 
and the holographic Will naming him Mrs. Smith's sole beneficiary remained intact (Tr. p. 342, L. 20-
22). Attorney Belnap testified, as an expert witness, that even people of ordinary financial means 
should eschew a holographic will (Tr. p. 222, L.10 to 223, L.1). 
(c) Post-will conduct which reflected Vernon's disposition to influence his mother and 
to cast Joseph in a bad light, tending to alienate him from his mother. See pages 30-33 above. 
(d) Vernon abused the 2008 POA (Exhibit 4) by gifting the entirety of Mrs. Smith's 
assets to his LLC without the power to do so. Order herein entered on July 19, 2016 (R. p.1049) 
(e) In derogation of the Court's order entered July 19, 2016, Vernon has not conveyed 
the real property back to the Estate (R. p. 1049; Tr. p. 383, L.1 to 384, L.1; Exhibits 12 through 17) 
(f) After requesting probate of the holographic Will (Exhibit 208), Vernon asserted that 
no assets remained in this Estate because of his 2012 conveyance to his limited liability company, VHS 
Properties, LLC. (Tr. p. 386, L. 2-23). This flip-flop was triggered by Joseph, a presumptive heir, 
recording a legitimate lis pendens on the Estate real property (Tr. p. 387, L. 3 - 25). 
(g) As noted above (p. 11), there is direct evidence that Vernon overrode Mrs. Smith's 
charitable aspirations in 2007 and frustrated Father Faucher's attempts to contact his mother, even for 
pastoral care (Tr. p. 414, L.10 to p. 415, L.16). 
Testamentary result indicative of undue influence:  
The fourth and final element of undue influence is a testamentary result that indicates undue 
influence. Conway, 152 Idaho at 939. Idaho courts have previously held that "[i]n determining the 
legality of a will the instrument itself may be examined and if it appears unnatural, unjust or irrational, 
such fact may be taken into consideration. In re Lunders Estate, 74. Idaho 448, 451, 263 P.2d 1002, 
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1004 (Idaho 1953), citing In re Heazle's Estate, 74 Idaho 72, 257 P.2d 556 (1953); In re Arnold's 
Estate, 16 Cal.2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 (1940). 
A will which entirely cuts out two of the decedent's three children is "unnatural, unreasonable 
and unjust", particularly where, prior to execution of the Will, there was a warm, loving relationship 
between Victoria and Joseph and Joseph's family. There is simply no evidence of estrangement or 
hostility between Victoria and Joseph or between Victoria and her daughter Vicky that would justify 
or explain the terms of her holographic Will at the time of its execution. The only reasonable 
explanation is that the Will was the product of Vernon's undue influence. 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARISING OUTSIDE THE 
FEBRUARY 14' WINDOW IS ADMISSIBLE.  
An assessment of undue influence merely by taking a snapshot of the day of the Will's  
execution would be an incomplete assessment. Evidence relevant to "susceptibility" and 
"opportunity" is not rendered inadmissible by the passage of time: Appellant Vernon argues that the 
moment to assess the existence of undue influence is "at the time [Mrs. Smith] executed her 
holographic will in 1990" (Appellant Brief, p. 36). The Magistrate correctly ruled that the degree to 
which relevant evidence is remote in time to the execution of the Will goes to the weight of that 
evidence, not its admissibility: 
Again, I want to emphasize, and I went back and listened to some of 
what occurred yesterday, that the mere fact that I have allowed some 
very remote evidence in is not an indication that I think it has the same 
weight as those things which are much more more closer in time to the 
creation of the holographic will. And that — and my purpose, too, is to 
allow the parties to make argument as to why and what weight should be 
given to any of those things. 
and: 
And I think I told the parties before that actions taken by Mr. V.K. Smith 
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with respect to his mother's property, it may very well be relevant. We 
can certainly argue that the time issues that may be to weight, but they 
certainly are relevant. 
Tr. p. 287, LL. 11-20; 346, LL.1-5. 
The Magistrate's focus on post-Will events is relevant to the "opportunity" which Vernon 
had to influence Mrs. Smith, functioning as an ubiquitous presence in her affairs. See discussion below 
(pp. 37, 38) re Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291, 1301 (Ohio, 1991) and the ongoing opportunity 
an attorney/beneficiary may have to assure himself that the will is not revoked. As noted in the 
document he authored in which he sought to transfer the entirety of her assets to his limited liability 
company, Vernon was the "sole source . . . of control of all assets of Victoria H. Smith, beginning 
after his father's death . . ." (Exhibit 5, p. 1) 
Instances of alienation include the following: (1) the well easement; (2) the fence dispute 
resulting in Joseph's management termination; (3) dispute over the Hamer property; and (4) Vernon's 
orchestrating the dispute over the foreclosure of his ex-wife's residence. See above, pages 30-31. 
These incidents are also probative of Mrs. Smith's susceptibility to Vernon's influence. 
The record is devoid of evidence that Joseph or his wife, Sharon, acted with the intent to 
antagonize or otherwise alienate Mrs. Smith. 
Instances of Vernon seeking to isolate his mother include the following: (1) Vernon made it 
"plain to [Joseph] that [he] wasn't to see [his] mother" (Tr. p. 179, L. 6-20). (2) In 2008, Mrs. Smith 
was hospitalized and Joseph and his family did not become aware of it until Mrs. Smith returned home 
(Tr. p. 176, L.1-3). (3) Victoria's granddaughter, Kate Laxon, testified how Vernon failed to consent 
to her visiting Victoria (Tr. p. 442, L. 8 to p. 445, L. 11); (4) Father Faucher was refused access to 
Victoria by Vernon, i.e., suspension of her years of faithful church attendance (Tr. p. 409, L.11 to 412, 
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L.24); and (5) Vernon failed to advise Mrs. Smith to consult an estate planning expert respecting tax 
issues with respect to her multi-million dollar estate. (Tr. p. 342, L. 20-22). 
In the instance of an attorney/beneficiary, exploitation of the testatrix' susceptibility can  
persist until death: 
 Unlike undue influence in the execution and delivery of a deed, constant vigilance 
by the undue influencer/beneficiary must be maintained over the testatrix because of her ability to 
revoke the will. Where the testatrix' attorney is named as a beneficiary, the Ohio Supreme Court views 
this circumstance as a "powerful disincentive" to be sensitive to the client's wishes which would "be 
a form of undue influence that could be exerted years after the execution of the will naming the attorney 
as a beneficiary": 
Not only is the testator particularly vulnerable to his attorney's influence, 
but also, the attorney, unlike others, will often be in a position to 
exercise that influence even after the will has been executed. A 
disinterested attorney could be expected to pick up cues, even fairly 
subtle cues, that his client's testamentary intentions may have changed 
since the will was executed. The disinterested attorney could then be 
expected to suggest that his client consider whether to amend the 
testamentary disposition by executing a codicil or a new will. On the 
other hand, an attorney who is named as a beneficiary in the will, like 
Dillon, will have an obvious and powerful disincentive to suggest to his 
client that it may be an appropriate time to consider revising the will. 
When the testator's attorney is a beneficiary of the will, like Dillon, there 
is even the possibility that the attorney might use his position as the 
testator's confidential advisor to frustrate a clearly expressed intention 
to alter the existing testamentary disposition. This would be a form of 
undue influence that could be exerted years after the execution of the 
will naming the attorney as a beneficiary. 
Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d at 1301 (emphasis added). 
Thus here, "susceptibility" of the testatrix Victoria and "opportunity" for the 
attorney/beneficiary Vernon existed from the date of the will's execution and continued until her death. 
Temporal remoteness from the actual date of the Will's execution do not diminish the weight of this 
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evidence. 
The Magistrate properly sustained the objection to the admission of appellant Vernon's  
Exhibit 257: 
 Exhibit 257 is an emotion-laden email from Mrs. Converse sent shortly after her mother's 
death. The email is limited to Mrs. Converse' feelings toward her mother, and, apart from being written 
post-death and 23 years after the Will's authorship, is not relevant. That is, the email fails to shed light 
on her mother's susceptibility to undue influence or Vernon's opportunity and disposition to undertake 
undue influence. As the Magistrate opined: 
This (Exhibit 257) was written some 20 years after this will was put 
in place. The issue is what was--whether the mother was unduly 
influenced back in the early 90s when she—or just prior to her writing 
this holographic will. It is not relevant that this daughter upon her 
[mother's] death bed some 20 years later has certain feelings and is 
expressing it. . . . So I am going to sustain the objection and I am 
not going to consider it at all. 
Tr. p. 47, L. 6 - 18 (bracketed material explanatory). 
WHILE PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS TESTACY OVER INTESTACY, THIS 
POLICY IS LIMITED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS, AND DOES 
NOT PERTAIN TO THE EXISTENCE, OR NOT, OF UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
 
Were the Court to find that either Joseph or Ms. Converse, but not both, was the victim of 
undue influence, the entire Will would have to be invalidated. While the common law prefers testacy 
to intestacy, this does not give a court the authority to speculate as to the intentions of the decedent. 
Courts favor testacy rather than intestacy. . . However, in order to 
avoid, intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not permitted to 
place on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is based 
on supposition as to the intention of the testator in the disposition of his 
estate [cases cited]. 
In re Corwin's Estate, 86 Idaho 1, 5, 383 P.2d 339 (1963). 
As can be seen by Corwin, the public policy favoring testacy over intestacy is limited to the 
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construction of wills and does not inform the common law in the undue influence context. 
If this Court finds that only one of the disinherited children was the victim of undue influence, 
it would be inappropriate for the Court to reconstruct distribution under the Will so as to avoid 
intestacy. That is, the Court cannot speculate as to the testamentary intentions of Mrs. Smith where 
only a portion of the Estate that was devised to Vernon as a result of undue influence. Under this 
circumstance, the Will no longer controls the distribution of the Estate property, and it must all pass 
according to the laws of intestacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the following points, Respondent Joseph H. Smith respectfully requests that the 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
be affirmed and the matter remanded to the Magistrate for completion of probate proceedings. 
Invalidity of Vernon's 2012 conveyance: 
 Given the absence of gifting authority in the Power 
of Attorney, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Vernon's conveyance of Mrs Smith's assets 
to his limited liability company was invalid as a matter of law. The Order of Partial Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed which returned all assets to Mrs. Smith's Estate, allowing those assets 
to pass by testate or intestate succession. 
Existence of undue influence: 
 The presumption of undue influence arises from Vernon's 
fiduciary relationship with the testatrix Victoria and from his participation in the execution of the 1990 
Will. In the Appellant Brief, he has failed to identify evidence in the record which rebuts the 
presumption. That is, Vernon did not meet his burden "of producing sufficient evidence of the 
nonexistence of at least one of the four prima facie elements of undue influence . . ." Bongiovi v. 
Jamison, 110 Idaho 734, 739, 718 P.2d 1172 (1986). Or stated differently, the record in this case does 
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not contain evidence from which the trial court "could reasonably find one or more elements of the 
Gmeiner test had not been met". Id. 
Even absent the presumption, there is "substantial and competent evidence" which supports by 
a preponderance of the evidence the existence of undue influence. Additionally, appellate deference 
must be given to the trial court's assessment of conflicting evidence and witness credibility. The 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed, i.e., invalidation of the 1990 holographic Will. 
By virtue of the invalidity of Vernon's 2012 conveyance and the invalidity of the 1990 
holographic Will, the assets in the Smith Estate must pass by intestate succession to the decedent's 
children, Vernon, Joseph and Ms. Converse. 
The frivolous prosecution of this appeal entitles the respondent Joseph to an award of 
attorney fees:  
(1) There is not a scintilla of evidence that the scope of the subject Power of Attorney includes 
gifting authority, rendering appellant Vernon's conveyances under that authority invalid. 
(2) It is undisputed that Vernon had a fiduciary relationship with the testatrix, was sole 
beneficiary in the Will, and participated in the Will's creation. These facts justify the presumption of 
undue influence. Appellant Vernon has not identified the "quantum" of evidence which rebuts the 
presumption as to even one element of undue influence (susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, or 
result). 
(3) Finally, Vernon has failed to identify in what particulars there is an absence of "substantial 
and competent evidence" to support the existence of undue influence. 
(4) Under these circumstances, the Idaho Code (§§ 12-121 and 15-8-208) and Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Rule 54(e)(2), I.R.C.P.) entitle the respondent Joseph to an award of attorney fees on 
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appeal. The frivolous prosecution of this appeal is exacerbated by Vernon's unfounded assertion that 
the Magistrate's thirty-seven page decision was "cursory" and "result-driven", i.e., accusing her, in 
effect, of both incompetence and bias. 
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Attorney at Law X 
 Hand delivery 
1900 W. Main Overnight delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83702 Facsimile (345-1129) 
E-file 
Rory R. Jones 
Jones Gledhill 
225 N. 9th 
 Street, Ste. 820 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 




    
Randall A. Peterman U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Givens Pursley, LLP X  Hand delivery 
601 W. Bannock St. Overnight delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83702 Facsimile (331-1529) 
E-file 
Allen B. Ellis 
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